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fafchamp.This paper investigates the contractual practices of African manufacturing ﬁrms and exam-
ines whether economic agents use long-term relationships to make contractual performance con-
tingent upon external shocks. Evidence to this effect has already been uncovered in credit tran-
sactions among villagers (e.g., Udry (1990, 1994), Lund and Fafchamps (1997)) and ﬁshermen
(e.g., Platteau and Abraham (1987)). In contrast to these earlier works that focused on small indi-
vidual transactions in a rural setting, this paper analyzes the extent of contractual ﬂexibility
among large manufacturing ﬁrms.
Very little is known about how African markets operate in practice. Fafchamps et al.
(1994), Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995), and Fafchamps (1996) have shown that con-
tracts between African manufacturers and their suppliers and clients often are renegotiated: sup-
plies occasionally arrive late or their quality is different from what was ordered, and clients
sometimes pay late. Although some modicum of contractual ﬂexibility is prevalent the world
over, casual observation and anthropological accounts (e.g., Cohen (1969), Meillassoux (1971),
Amselle (1977), Geertz, Geertz and Rosen (1979)) suggest that African ﬁrms have a more elastic
deﬁnition of ﬂexibility -- to the point where it may have become a source of misunderstanding
and cultural prejudice. In their dealings with Africans, for instance, foreigners are often taken by
surprise by contractual delays and calls for contractual renegotiation, from which they are quick
to conclude that African ﬁrms (and Africans in general) are unreliable and opportunistic. This is
true not only of the occasional traveler, but also of western ﬁrms wishing to source products from
Africa (e.g., Biggs et al. (1994)).
This paper examines evidence on contractual ﬂexibility among African manufacturing
ﬁrms using data collected in six countries: Burundi, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. The empirical analysis tests simple theoretical predictions regarding the incidence of
contractual problems and the way contractual disputes are resolved. Results provide the ﬁrst
empirical evidence regarding the extent of and local remedies to contractual non-performance in
African manufacturing. They now need to be compared with contractual practices in other parts
of the world.
As Fafchamps, Gunning and Oostendorp (1997) have shown, contractual risk affects ﬁrms’
decisions in a non trivial manner. Zimbabwean manufacturing ﬁrms that face a higher frequency
of delayed supplies are shown to accumulate signiﬁcantly more inventories of inputs than ﬁrms
that face little risk. Like precautionary saving protects households against income shocks (e.g.,
Deaton (1991), Kimball (1990), Zeldes (1989)), inventory accumulation protects ﬁrms against
stockout risk (e.g., Krane (1994), Kahn (1987)). Contractual risk may have yet other effects on
ﬁrm behavior, such as investment, expansion into new markets, and resistance to shocks; study-
ing them is left for future research.
Our results are consistent with the idea that contractual ﬂexibility is a rational response to
risk. Expectations regarding contractual performance are thus likely to reﬂect the environment in
which ﬁrms operate: the riskier the environment, the higher the need for ﬂexibility, the higher the
incidence of contract non-performance, and the higher the expectation of renegotiation. We
therefore expect ﬁrms operating in a high risk environment to share different expectations regard-
ing standards of contractual performance than ﬁrms operating in a low risk environment. When
ﬁrms that normally operate in low risk environments are put into contact with high risk ﬁrms,
contradictory expectations of contractual behavior are likely to lead to misunderstanding and
feed mutual prejudice (see Biggs et al. (1994) for illustrations). Although this paper does not
address these issues directly, results presented here suggest that African manufacturers who
export their products face fewer payment recovery problems, while those who import encounter
more delays in input delivery, possibly because of delays in transportation. More work is needed
to assess whether African ﬁrms exposed to outside inﬂuences through trade adopt Western-style
contractual practices in their local operations or rather take advantage of local tolerance for late2
payment and delivery to meet their stricter obligations towards international suppliers and
clients.
Section 1. Markets and Contract Flexibility
The last two decades have witnessed a world-wide renewed faith in the capacity of market
forces to allocate resources efﬁciently. Governments have been advised to stop meddling in the
allocation process and to let the ’free market’ reign. Very little, however, is know as to how a free
market actually operates in practice. In particular, we know precious little about how ﬁrms deal
with each other. For instance, it is unclear how ﬁrms which otherwise compete with each other
and have opposed interests manage to prevent opportunistic breaches of contract. Yet if the
market is to do a better resource allocation job than the government, then surely it must deter or
at least minimize cheating among economic agents.
Markets and Opportunism
Microeconomic textbooks depict market transactions as simple exchanges whose economic
content is fully described by price and quantity. Evidence collected in Africa and elsewhere sug-
gests otherwise. Purchases of inputs and sales of output -- let alone the provision of labor or
credit -- are plagued by a variety of moral hazard, adverse selection, and contract enforcement
problems that shape economic exchange and determine how efﬁcient markets are (e.g.,
Fafchamps (1996)). Building upon the works of Kranton (1996) and Ghosh and Ray (1996),
Fafchamps (1998a) shows that a decentralized market can discipline itself if cheating is inter-
preted as a sign of incompetence. The mechanism by which opportunism is deterred, however,
leads to markets that differ signiﬁcantly from those described in economic textbooks. For one
thing, exchange is not anonymous but relational: ﬁrms economize on screening incompetent
partners by establishing long-term relationships with other ﬁrms they have learn to trust. As in
Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) model of unemployment as a disciplining device, cheating by com-
petent is deterred by the fear of having to search for a new partner.
Relational contracting is, however, an impediment to fully efﬁcient exchange because it
makes it costly for ﬁrms to switch partners. This may be alright in stable economic environments
in which patterns of exchange are constant over time. But if ﬁrms must respond to rapidly chang-
ing economic conditions by constantly seeking new partners, being stuck with the same partner
forever is not optimal. In this case, Greif (1993) and Fafchamps (1998a) have shown that infor-
mation sharing can dramatically increase the ﬂuidity of exchange by reducing the penalty for
switching partner.2
The above mentioned work suffers from on major shortcoming, however: it assumes that
cheating is a cut and dry affairs, i.e., ﬁrms can always honor their contractual obligations, the
only problem is to ensure that they do. Yet, in real life, circumstances beyond their control arise
in which ﬁrms are unable to comply with a contract: a power outage may delay production, civil
strife may interfere with delivery, or the central bank may not release the foreign exchange on
time. The circumstances that impede contractual performance may be temporary or permanent. If
they are temporary, it seems like a waste to cancel a perfectly good relationship simply because
one of the partners is temporarily unable to perform. Intuitively, it is in the interest of the two
parties to work things out until the difﬁculty is over. Fafchamps (1996) indeed demonstrates that
if there are exogenous circumstances in which one party, say A, is unable to comply with its
________________
2 To achieve this purpose, however, the stigmatization of cheaters may be necessary; see Milgrom, North and
Weingast (1991) and Fafchamps (1998a) for details. Firms may also seek to economize on screening costs by relying
on statistical discrimination or by refusing to deal with ﬁrms outside their network. These issues are discussed in Greif
(1994) and Fafchamps (1998b).3
contractual obligations, then it is not in the interest of the other party B to insist on harsh punish-
ment for breach of contract. Doing so would only incite A to refuse to trade ex ante.3 In this case,
it is optimal for the parties to recognize that exogenous circumstances may prevent them from
honoring their obligations and to build ﬂexibility into the contract. When exchange is relational,
ﬂexibility is facilitated by the implicit agreement that binds the parties: if one party feels cheated,
it can decide to break the relationship and force the other party to look for another supplier or
client. In addition, the aggrieved party may seek reparation by enlisting the help of an external
contract enforcement agency. The existence of an implicit threat to seek outside reparation only
if trust has been broken helps the parties to economize on writing the contract. There is no need
to write all contingencies down; all that is required is that parties apply the contract in good faith,
that is, to the best of their capacity. These theoretical arguments are clear and have been formal-
ized elsewhere (e.g., Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Fafchamps (1996)). What is unclear is whether
they are relevant at all in practice.
Contract Flexibility
Evidence suggests that market transactions, far from being rigid contracts, exhibit an unex-
pected degree of ﬂexibility (e.g., Lorenz (1988), Fafchamps (1996), Fafchamps, Pender and
Robinson (1995)). To fully understand how markets operate in practice, we need to understand
what ﬂexibility means and why it exists. Flexibility arises when contractual performance is made
explicitly or implicitly contingent upon external events affecting one of the parties. The idea is
that a supplier who cannot deliver or client who cannot pay is allowed to renegotiate the contract
and default from his or her original obligations. Flexibility is thus a form of insurance, of risk
sharing.
Fafchamps (1996) has argued that, unless contract are ﬂexible, economic exchange cannot
take place. This is because parties can never to totally sure they can comply with their contrac-
tual obligations: external events may prevent them from doing so. Unless they can exonerate
themselves from obligations that have become too onerous, they will refuse to engage them-
selves. Allowing parties too much ﬂexibility, however, is opening room for much abuse. Contrac-
tual obligations must therefore be sufﬁciently ﬂexible that parties are not afraid to engage them-
selves, but not so ﬂexible that opportunistic behavior is overtly encouraged. The facility with
which agents can monitor each other makes it easier for them to condition contractual perfor-
mance on conditions affecting the parties. How much information circulates may depend on local
information sharing institutions -- and the ability to cross-check information -- and on agents’
capacity to personally monitor each other. One of the objectives of this paper is to provide evi-
dence on how ﬂexibility operates in practice.
Section 2. Evidence from African Manufacturing
In this section we provide evidence of relational contracting and contract ﬂexibility among
African manufacturing ﬁrms. We also seek to identify a set of robust predictors of contractual
risk and of choices of conﬂict resolution methods. The data that we use for this purpose come
from surveys of manufacturing ﬁrms conducted in six countries of Sub-Saharan Africa: Burundi,
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The surveys were conducted by a
variety of national teams coordinated by the Regional Program of Enterprise Development of the
World Bank. Although the data are generally comparable, occasional discrepancies occur and
________________
3 To see why, consider the following caricatural example. Suppose a bank proposes to lend you one million dollars
free of interest but stipulates that, in case the money is not repaid in full by a given date, you will be executed. To the
extent that circumstances beyond your control may prevent you from repaying the bank with absolute certainty, you
may very well decide that the contract is unattractive.4
some data are not available for certain countries.
Characteristics of surveyed ﬁrms
In each of the six countries, random samples were drawn among manufacturing ﬁrms in
four sectors of economic activity: textile and garment; metal products; wood and furniture; and
food processing (see Table 1). Samples sizes vary from 120 ﬁrms in Burundi to 238 ﬁrms in Cam-
eroon. Firms with fewer than 5 employees were excluded from the sample. The data thus
represent the small to large scale manufacturing sector in Africa; microenterprises are ignored.
The average number of employees for the six countries is 144; sample ﬁrms are largest in Zim-
babwe (301 workers on average), and smallest in Burundi (76). The Zimbabwe sample is made of
relatively old ﬁrms with an average age of 25 years; younger ﬁrms are found in the three French-
speaking countries of the sample. Sixty percent of the surveyed ﬁrms have a legal status that lim-
its the liability of the ﬁrm to its own assets; other ﬁrms are held either in sole proprietorship or in
partnership. Over one quarter of the surveyed ﬁrms operate under partial or complete foreign
ownership, with a high of 62% in Ivory Coast and a low of 12% in Zambia. Partial or complete
state ownership occurs for less than 5% of sample ﬁrms.
The ethnic makeup of the sample ﬁrms varies dramatically among countries. In two of the
seven countries, less than half of the sample ﬁrms have ethnic Africans as owners. Ethnic Euro-
peans are predominant in Zimbabwe and maintain a strong presence in Cameroon and Ivory
Coast. Asians occupy a dominant position in Kenyan manufacturing and are present elsewhere as
well. The implications of this ethnic differentiation are discussed in detail in Fafchamps (1998b).
The way ﬁrms deal with clients and suppliers is depicted in Table 2. Most surveyed ﬁrms
sell at least part of their output to end-users of their products such as manufacturers and consu-
mers; the rest is sold primarily to wholesalers and retailers. About a quarter of surveyed ﬁrms do
at least some of their business with publicly owned entities. On average, sample ﬁrms export
9.6% of their output; this proportion is highest in Ivory Coast and lowest in Zambia. Some form
of written agreement -- e.g., a signed invoice -- is used in less than half the sales to clients. The
explanation lies in the length of the relationship that binds ﬁrms with their clients. Data on the
number of years ﬁrms have dealt with their clients are not available but the data show that ﬁrms
have on average dealt for close to 8 years with their problematic customers, that is, those that
recently failed to pay or paid late. Problematic customers are primarily individual consumers.
Roughly one tenth of late and non-payment cases occur with relatives or kin.4
More detailed information is available on ﬁrms’ suppliers (see second part of Table 2). A
quarter of the ﬁrms deal with at least one monopolist among their major suppliers. Monopolies
appear more commonplace in Zimbabwe, a feature already noted by Gunning and Mumbengegwi
(1995) and a possible heritage of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) period during
which an international embargo forced the country to be self-sufﬁcient. A quarter of surveyed
ﬁrms’ inputs are imported; the rest is bought locally, possibly from importers. Firms in Burundi
and Cameroon are more likely to be direct importers of inputs than ﬁrms in the other three coun-
tries.
Firms are extremely loyal to their suppliers. They purchase on average close to three quar-
ters of their most important inputs from the same suppliers, whom they have known for 9.5 years
________________
4 Respondents were asked to mention whether the problematic client was either (1) a relative or family member;
(2) a member of the same tribe or ethnic group; or (3) none of the above. They seem to have interpreted the question
of ethnicity in the narrower sense of kinship. For instance, even in a country such as Burundi where 82% of
respondents are Africans and where Hutus constitute close to 90% of the population, only 7% of the respondents said
that the problematic client was from the same ethnic group. This could not have occurred if respondents had
interpreted ethnicity as meaning Hutu or Tutsi or white.5
on average. Only a ﬁfth of the ﬁrms place infrequent orders; others have regular relationships
with suppliers. These relationships, however, are primarily based on business acquaintance, not
family or ethnicity; only 6% of the surveyed ﬁrms mention that one of their regular suppliers is a
relative or personal friend; 12% have a supplier who is from the same ’ethnic group’ as them.
Less than forty percent of the surveyed ﬁrms receive credit from their supplier; this propor-
tion is lowest in Zambia and highest in Zimbabwe. The average payment term over all sample
ﬁrms is three weeks; it is of course higher for those who receive supplier credit. Trade credit
among African manufacturing ﬁrms is discussed in detail in Cuevas et al. (1993), Fafchamps et
al. (1994), Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995), and Fafchamps (1997). In contrast, advance
payment is rare: only 4.3% of the surveyed ﬁrms resort to it, often because the supplier insists on
it.
Table 2 also reports the characteristics of problematic suppliers, that is, those who fail to
deliver on time or who deliver deﬁcient quality. Less than 10% of the breaches of contract occur
with ﬁrst-time suppliers, possibly because ﬁrms do so little of their business with unfamiliar sup-
pliers. On average, ﬁrms have known problematic suppliers for 8.2 years -- only marginally less
than the length of time they have known their suppliers in general. Problematic suppliers are pri-
marily other ﬁrms; less than 13% of recent cases of contract non-performance were with public
ﬁrms.
Incidence of contractual disputes and conﬂict resolution methods
Next we turn to the incidence of contractual disputes with clients (Table 3). The data show
that roughly two thirds of the sample ﬁrms experienced some cases of late payment by clients
during the 12 months preceding the survey; close half of them faced cases of non payment. With
23.4 occurrences of late payment per year, the annual average of late payment cases is close to
ten times the average number of non-payment cases, suggesting that late payment is a more com-
mon phenomenon than non payment.
In the great majority of cases of late and non payment, ﬁrms attempt to resolve the problem
through direct negotiations with the client. This proportion is highest in Cameroon and Burundi,
lowest in Zimbabwe. A small number of ﬁrms resort to private arbitration loosely deﬁned;5 Some
8.7% of sampled ﬁrms ever called or threatened to call upon the police for help. In one fourth of
the problematic cases, the dispute was either brought to the attention of a lawyers and ended up
in court or the threat of legal action was resorted to by the parties. Sharp differences exist among
countries: Zimbabwean ﬁrms were much more likely to go or threaten to go to court than those in
Burundi -- a possible reﬂection on the relative reliability of their court systems and the size of
surveyed ﬁrms in each country. Nearly one half the cases of late and non payment were settled
by the time of the survey. Most of the respondents were satisﬁed with the terms of the settlement,
with little difference across countries. Parties continued to trade in 43.8% of the cases -- more in
Burundi, less in Zimbabwe -- suggesting that conﬂict resolution methods are moderately success-
ful in solving disputes and bringing parties back together.
Contractual disputes with suppliers are less frequent and less dramatic (see second part of
Table 3). A third of the surveyed ﬁrms experienced a late delivery in the year preceding the sur-
vey. Untimely delivery was complained about most often in Zimbabwe and least often in
Burundi. The number of reported cases is also much higher in Zimbabwe than elsewhere,
________________
5 Strictly deﬁned, private arbitration is a process by which parties to a contract agree to grant authority to a third
party to legally resolve a dispute between them. The arbitrator has the power to adjudicate the dispute and his or her
judgement is, in many developed countries, granted the full protection of the law, at par with other judgements. It
unlikely that all respondents were acquainted with this legal deﬁnition; their answers probably lump together formal
arbitrators and informal mediators with no adjudication power.6
suggesting that input delivery risk is particularly problematic in Zimbabwe.6 Cases of deﬁcient
quality are reported by one third of the surveyed ﬁrms. As with clients, the most commonly used
conﬂict resolution method is direct bargaining. Recourse to other conﬂict resolution methods is
extremely rare: only 3.8% of the surveyed ﬁrms went to see a lawyer following disputes regard-
ing late delivery or deﬁcient quality. Fafchamps (1996) reports similar results for Ghana. Most
disputes with suppliers are settled and ﬁrms continue to trade, even if they are not fully satisﬁed
with the outcome.
To summarize, surveyed ﬁrms have long term relationships with their clients and suppliers
to whom they are very loyal. These relationships are primarily grounded in business acquain-
tance; family, friendship, and ethnicity play little role in fostering them. The data indicate that
contractual disputes occur frequently and that most ﬁrms are affected. Without equivalent data
from other parts of the world, however, we cannot say whether contractual disputes are more fre-
quent in Africa than elsewhere. The majority of contractual disputes are resolved amicably and
trade is resumed in most cases. Direct negotiation is the preferred conﬂict resolution strategy.
Detailed examination of the data reveals that outside parties such as arbitrators, lawyers, or the
police, are called upon only in more serious cases of contractual breach such as those involving
non payment. Taken together, these results are consistent with the importance of contractual
ﬂexibility in helping ﬁrms deal with risk, and with the role of long-term relationships is helping
ﬁrms resolve contractual disputes through face-to-face negotiation.
For the sake of comparison, we report on Table 4 various published indicators of legal
environment and the rule of law. They show that, of the six countries studied, Zimbabwe enjoys
the highest rankings as to whether the legal system enforces contracts and legal suit can be
brought against businesses, according to World Economic Forum (1998). It is also the country
for which, according to our data, manufacturing ﬁrms are the most likely to sue for breach of con-
tract. The relationship stops there, however, as the rankings in terms of reliability on legal insti-
tutions among the other countries do not correspond to actual use of courts and lawyers. More-
over, although Zimbabwe is the country where courts and lawyers are used most intensively, it is
also the place with the highest incidence of payment problems. The existence of a good legal
system thus seems insufﬁcient to deter all breaches of contract. Table 4 also brings to light the
reluctance of the general public for the legal resolution of disputes. This may explain the impor-
tant role of direct bargaining as the dominant conﬂict resolution method. Other institutional indi-
cators such as those used by Keefer and Knack (1997) show little relation with observed conﬂict
resolution practices, except perhaps for Burundi (Table 4).
Section 3. Econometric analysis
To further our understanding of contractual disputes and conﬂict resolution, we continue
with a multivariate econometric analysis of the data. Given the total absence of previous work on
these issues in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, we proceed with caution and we refrain from
imposing too much structure on the estimation. We seek to identify possible determinants of
three basic processes: (1) the incidence and frequency of contractual disputes; (2) the choice of
conﬂict resolution method, given that a dispute has arisen; and (3) the outcome of the dispute.
We examine these three issues in turn. Regressors include the contractual environment in which
the ﬁrm operates, measured by the average incidence of contractual problems and the average
propensity to threaten court action in delinquent payment cases among ﬁrms operating in the
same country and sector; the characteristics of the industry, proxied by country, town size, and
sector dummies; the characteristics of individual ﬁrms, i.e., size, age, legal status, and ethnicity
________________
6 Fafchamps, Gunning and Oostendorp (1997) indeed show that contractual risk incites Zimbabwean
manufacturers to accumulate inventories.7
of owner/manager; the characteristics of clients and suppliers the ﬁrm deals with; and the way
ﬁrms deal with contract non-performance. Data from the six countries are combined whenever
possible but location dummies are included to control for systematic differences across locations.
The Incidence and Frequency of Contractual Disputes
Following our discussion of the theoretical literature in Section 1, we expect the frequency
of contractual disputes to reﬂect the environment in which ﬁrms operate: enterprises that buy and
sell in countries or sectors in which contractual disputes are frequent should face more problems
than ﬁrms that operate in a more disciplined environment. Three sets of variables are used to con-
trol for market environment effects: location dummies; sectoral dummies; and the average fre-
quency of contractual disputes and threat of court action in each country and sector.7 Kenya is
the omitted country; small town is the omitted city size; food processing is the omitted sector.
The incidence of contractual disputes is also likely to vary with characteristics of the ﬁrm.
Larger ﬁrms, for instance, conduct more transactions and are thus expected to encounter more
problems than small ﬁrms.8 Older ﬁrms may have identiﬁed more reliable clients and suppliers
and thus face fewer problems (e.g., Bade and Chifamba (1994), Fafchamps (1998b)). Firms with
a limited liability status may be more willing to take risk with clients and suppliers and are thus
expected to face more contractual disputes. Given the existence of business network effects in
African manufacturing (e.g., Fafchamps (1998b), Barr (1997)), one would expect better con-
nected ﬁrm managers to screen clients and suppliers more easily and thus to experience fewer
breaches of contract. It is also possible that the attitude of ﬁrms vis a vis contracts reﬂects cul-
tural values that are shaped by ethnic identiﬁcation (e.g., Greif (1993, 1994)). To the extent that
the ethnicity of the owner/manager is correlated with membership in business networks and cul-
tural attitudes, it should be included as regressor. We include a dummy for ethnic African and
ethnic European management; Asian management is the omitted category. For the same reason,
we include dummies for ﬁrms that have some foreign or state ownership.
The nature of the relationships that ﬁrms maintain with their clients and suppliers could
also affect the incidence of contractual problems. Here we are somewhat limited by the nature of
the information collected in the survey. For clients, we include the share of exports in total sales,
as well as dummies for whether the ﬁrm sells to individual end-users and whether it sells to pub-
lic entities. Although payment delays in export markets are longer, the institutional mechanism
of the letter of credit is expected to reduce the incidence of payment problems since payment is
no longer at the discretion of the buyer. Selling to traders (the omitted category) is generally per-
ceived to be safer than selling to individual end-users such as manufacturers and ﬁnal consumers.
The reason is that traders are in general more liquid and have a faster cash turn-around. Selling to
public entities is expected to raise the incidence of payment problems because governments
everywhere, but particularly in Africa, are notorious for paying with delay.
For suppliers, more varied data are available. We include indicators of market power (share
of imported inputs plus dummies for whether the ﬁrm faces a monopolistic supplier or a public
supplier for at least one of its inputs); indicators of social capital (length of relationship with
________________
7 Each observation is omitted from its own average to avoid endogeneity bias. Because of high multicollinearity
across average frequency measures, a single frequency measure is used in the regression analysis: the frequency of
late payment in regressions involving clients, and the frequency of late deliveries in regressions involving suppliers.
In all regressions, the average frequency of threat of court action refers to payment disputes with clients.
8 The number of transactions a ﬁrm is engaged in over a set period of time is not proportional to size, however,
since larger ﬁrms typically engage in larger transactions. Moreover, ﬁrms may differ in what they mean by a
transaction. For a small ﬁrm selling purely on a cash basis, a transaction is a single sale or purchase; for a large ﬁrm, a
transaction can be an order or an invoice, depending on the context. These differences complicate the collection of
data across ﬁrms of different sizes.8
suppliers, percentage of purchases from main suppliers, and dummies whether ﬁrm buys from
family and friends and whether ﬁrm only makes infrequent purchases); and indicators of credit
terms (dummies for whether the ﬁrm receives supplier credit and whether it gives advance pay-
ment). We expect market power to raise the incidence of contractual problems since monopolists
can more easily get away with breaches of contract. In contrast, we anticipate that stronger rela-
tionships with suppliers should reduce the frequency of problems. Finally, we expect that more
complex contracts involving credit open more room for breach of contract and thus should raise
the frequency of problems. Because the nature of the relationships that ﬁrms maintain with
clients and suppliers is potentially endogenous, results should only be interpreted as indicative of
empirical regularities.
Logit regressions on the incidence of contractual problems with clients and suppliers are
presented in Tables 5 and 6. Coefﬁcients are reported in the form of odds ratio to improve reada-
bility; an odds ratio greater (smaller) than one means the regressor raises (reduces) the probabil-
ity of a contractual problem. Results indicate that there are signiﬁcant differences across coun-
tries and sectors but also that these differences are not well captured by contract environment
variables.9 Some countries such as Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Ivory Coast have a higher incidence of
payment problems. These also tend to be more advanced countries by African standards. Zim-
babwe experiences a higher incidence of supplier-related problems, a result consistent with
Fafchamps, Gunning and Oostendorp’s (1997) ﬁnding that supplier risk has a signiﬁcant effect on
manufacturing inventories in that country. As expected the incidence of problems is higher
among large ﬁrms, but the effect is not always signiﬁcant. Older ﬁrms face more non-payment
problems, not less, suggesting that older ﬁrms do not have a signiﬁcant screening advantage over
younger ﬁrms. Surprisingly, both African and European-managed ﬁrms face more cases of non-
payment than Asian-managed ﬁrms: if network and cultural effects are present, in this broad sam-
ple of African manufacturing ﬁrms they do not unilaterally disadvantage African ﬁrms, contrary
to what w as suggested by Fafchamps’s (1998b) work on Zimbabwe and Kenya.
Regarding the effect of relation-speciﬁc variables, we ﬁnd that selling to public ﬁrms raises
the probability of late payment. In contrast, selling in export markets reduces the incidence of
payment problems. The effect is large: a ﬁrm that exports all its output is four to ﬁve times less
likely to experience a late or non payment problem than a ﬁrm that exports nothing. But this
effect may be due more to reliance of institutional mechanisms such as the letter of credit rather
than exemplary behavior on the part of international buyers. Indeed, on the supplier side, late
delivery is shown to be more likely for ﬁrms that import much of their raw materials. The reason
for this empirical regularity is again unclear and it could be due to transportation and customs
delays. These issues deserves more investigation. On the supplier side, we ﬁnd that monopolis-
tic suppliers do not, in general, take advantage of their market power: if anything, the incidence
of contractual problems is lower with monopolistic suppliers. Public suppliers cause more prob-
lems on average but the effect is only signiﬁcant for deﬁcient quality. Late delivery is more fre-
quent among ﬁrms that import their inputs, a likely reﬂection of the vagaries of African transpor-
tation and port systems. The length and strength of a ﬁrm’s relationship with its suppliers have
the expected sign but they are not signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, ﬁrms that make infrequent purchases
encounter fewer problems. One likely explanation is that these ﬁrms are very small and operate
on a cash-and-carry basis only -- what Fafchamps (1998b) call the ﬂea market economy. Another
surprising result is that ﬁrms that buy from family and friends encounter more late delivery prob-
lems. One possible interpretation is that it is more difﬁcult to put pressure on family and friends
________________
9 Unreported regression results show that, when country and sectoral dummies are omitted, environment variables
are very signiﬁcant. Once country and sector dummies are included, however, they are no longer signiﬁcant. This may
be due to multicollinearity, given the way environment variables are constructed.9
than on regular suppliers, an idea already emphasized in Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995)
and Fafchamps et al. (1994). Finally, as expected, problems are much more frequent among ﬁrms
that receive or give credit to their suppliers, a result consistent with the idea that contractual
breach is more likely in more complex contracts, but the effect is in general not signiﬁcant.
Next, we examine the number of contractual problems ﬁrms face using a selection model
(e.g., Heckman (1976), Maddala (1983)). Results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. They conﬁrm
that large ﬁrms unmistakably face more problems than smaller ﬁrms -- hardly a surprise. Older
ﬁrms seem to do better with suppliers, a result in agreement with the idea that there are returns to
experience in choosing and dealing with suppliers. A high frequency of threat of court action is
associated with a lower probability of experiencing late payment, a result with is consistent with
the idea that stricter sanctions for breach of contract have a deterrent effect. Unfortunately for
this theory, legal threats are also associated with more cases of late payment and a higher propen-
sity to experience late delivery and deﬁcient quality with suppliers. More detailed work is
required to disentangle these issues. Again, exporters experience fewer payment problems, prob-
ably thanks to the letter of credit system.10 European-managed ﬁrms report more late payment
problems, contrary to what the business network idea had led us to expect. Firms buying from
friends and family and those who receive supplier credit run into more problems with suppliers.
Other relationship characteristics are not signiﬁcant, possibly because of endogeneity or omitted
variable bias. A thorough investigation of the causality between these various factors requires
instruments that are not available in these data and is left fur future research.
Next we seek to understand whether the frequency of problems varies signiﬁcantly across
categories of buyers. The survey recorded the type of client with whom respondents had their
most recent payment problem and coded answers into three main categories: individuals, domes-
tic ﬁrms, and public entities and other types of clients (e.g., foreign ﬁrms). Based on conversa-
tions with entrepreneurs, we suspect individual buyers to be riskier than ﬁrms because they are
smaller and can more easily evade debt recovery. To do a proper test, we would need data for
each respondent on the proportion of total sales going to these three categories of buyers. Unfor-
tunately these data are not available. What we know, however, is whether respondents sell to
public entities and individual end-users (who can either be individual customers or manufactur-
ing ﬁrms).
Results from a multinomial logit regression are reported in Table 9.11 They should be
regarded as suggestive only. As anticipated, respondents selling to public entities are more likely
to experience problems with such clients while ﬁrms that sell to individual end-users are less
likely to have problems with ﬁrms (the omitted category). Larger ﬁrms appear less likely to
experience problems with individuals and more likely to face difﬁculties with other ﬁrms or with
public entities. In contrast, African managed ﬁrms are more likely to face problems with indivi-
duals. These results may be due to the fact that larger, better connected ﬁrms deal more with for-
mal clients and are thus more likely to encounter recovery problems with such clients. An alter-
native interpretation is that African entrepreneurs interpret late and non payment as problems
with individuals and, for cultural reasons, answered the question differently. More research is
needed to ascertain which explanation is appropriate.
________________
10 The survey did not collect data on recourse to the letter of credit system, but informal discussions with
respondents in Kenya and Zimbabwe indicate that letters of credit are used in most imports and exports from outside
of Africa. Because of the informal nature of much intra-African trade, respondents seldom export or import within
Africa themselves. The only possible exception is trade with South-Africa.
11 An insufﬁcient number of observations precluded a similar analysis for suppliers.10
Conﬂict Resolution Methods
Theory predicts that conﬂict resolution methods play an important deterrence role. It is the
fear of sanction that induces agents to comply with their contractual obligations (e.g., North
(1990), Platteau (1994a, 1994b), Greif (1993)). These sanctions can take several forms (e.g.,
Fafchamps (1996)): guilt; harassment; loss of relationship and reputation; and recourse to legal
institutions such as courts and lawyers, but also private arbitration and, more prosaically, the pol-
ice. We focus here on two types of sanctions that are important in practice: legal recourse, and
loss of relationship.12
Simple models of relationships such as the ones presented by Kandori (1992), Greif (1993),
Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Fafchamps (1998a) predict that sanctions are applied as soon as
breach of contract occurs.13 Which type of sanction is chosen depends on their relative cost and
effectiveness. Given the existence of ﬁxed costs in legal proceedings, the threat of legal action is
seldom credible for small size transactions. Suing a poor individual with no assets is rarely cost
effective: the chance of recovering anything by legal means is slim so that it is not worth incur-
ring lawyers and court fees. Suing may also be unattractive if the contractual dispute is complex
and the evidence hard to verify, so that the outcome of the court process is uncertain. In contrast,
breaking a relationship is likely to be counterproductive if the other party is sole buyer or seller.
Legal sanctions may not work either; harassment may be the only viable alternative.
Whenever there exist uncertainty regarding the cause for the breach of contract, immediate
sanctions need not be optimal; a more gradual approach may be called for. To see why, suppose
for instance that agents can be hit by two types of shocks: temporary shocks and permanent
shocks. The former make it impossible for agents to comply with their contractual obligations for
a single period only; the latter make the agent permanently unable to comply (e.g., ban-
kruptcy).14 Intuitively, applying harsh sanctions is appropriate only when the other party has
been hit by a permanent shock. If the shock is only temporary, both parties are likely to be better
off renegotiating the contract and preserving their relationship. In these circumstances, the
natural response to a breach of contract is for both parties to communicate and negotiate until it
becomes clear that the shock is permanent, at which point hard sanctions are applied.
The negotiation subgame is itself fraught with problems, however. Waiting too long to sue
may enable the breaching party to hide assets and evade legal sanctions. The negotiation process
is thus likely to be limited in time. Renegotiation introduces an insurance-like element into the
contract. By analogy with the beneﬁts agents can obtain by ﬁling false insurance claims, parties
may proﬁt by calling for undue renegotiation, thereby abusing the other party’s willingness to
renegotiate contract terms. As a result, agents unable to monitor the situation of the other party
may optimally refuse to renegotiate for fear of abuse and may opt for hard sanctions instead.
Although market exchange would become impossible in the total absence of sanctions for
breach of contract (e.g., Benson (1990), Fafchamps (1996)), punishment of all breaches of con-
tract is not required; it is sufﬁcient that breach of contract be punished with a sufﬁciently high
probability. Consequently, some agents may be able to free-ride the system, i.e., refrain from
incurring any of the costs associated with conﬂict resolution and yet expect a low probability of
breach. By the same token, agents may choose to randomize, i.e., to punish only a certain percen-
tage of breaches they incur. In these cases and when it is clear that pursuing the breaching party
________________
12 Evidence regarding reputational sanctions is presented in Fukuyama (1995), Lorenz (1988), Hart (1988), Greif
(1993), Fafchamps (1996, 1997, 1998b).
13 This is but an application of the optimal penal code principle of Abreu (1988): gradual sanctions are
unnecessary; optimal deterrence is obtained when harsh sanctions are used to punish all deviations from cooperation.
14 These ideas could be extended to shocks to factors inﬂuencing agents’ willingness to pay without affecting their
ability to pay (e.g., Fafchamps (1996)).11
is futile, doing nothing may well be the optimal strategy.
This brief, heuristic discussion leads us to expect ﬁrms to differ in the way they seek to
resolve breach of contract. First, we expect to observe across countries and sectors some
differences in reliance on legal institutions that reﬂect the cost and predictability of legal
recourse. We control for such effects via location and sectoral dummies and the average
incidence of contractual conﬂicts. Second, large ﬁrms are more likely to engage in large transac-
tions and thus more likely to ﬁnd legal recourse cost effective. Third, older ﬁrms may have
acquired better negotiation and monitoring skills, and are likely to be more familiar with legal
institutions. We therefore expect them to be less likely to do nothing when faced with contractual
problems. To the extent that limited liability status creates a moral hazard problem and weakens
incentives, we expect such ﬁrms to be more casual about contractual breach and hence to be
more likely to do nothing. Firms may also use their business contacts to monitor contract renego-
tiation; as a result we expect ethnic Africans to be more likely to either do nothing or use legal
recourses given that they have fewer business connections in several of the countries we study,
such as Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe (e.g., Barr (1997), Fafchamps (1998b)). We also include
dummy variables indicating whether the ﬁrm has some foreign or state ownership. Next, ﬁrms
that value relationships ought to put more emphasis on direct bargaining once problems occur. In
contrast, ﬁrms that face monopolistic sellers may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to seek legal reparation. Finally,
ﬁrms receiving or granting credit to their suppliers ought not to remain inactive when faced with
contractual problems. We control for all these factors with the variables listed in the previous
subsection. Again, some of these variables are potentially subject to endogeneity bias, a bias we
cannot correct for because we do not have good instruments for relationships and network capi-
tal. Results should thus be interpreted as suggestive only.
We ﬁrst examine the probability with which ﬁrms seek to negotiate and threaten court
action conditional on having encountered a contractual breach. We use a multinomial
approach.15 For clients we divide respondents’ actions into four categories: (1) do nothing, (2)
only negotiate (the omitted category), (3) only use legal institutions, and (4) bargain and use
legal institutions simultaneously.16 For suppliers, the third and fourth categories are merged
given the small number of observations in each of them.17 Since the frequency of late delivery
and deﬁcient quality is much lower than that of recovery problems, there much fewer observa-
tions on the supplier side. Results are presented in Tables 10 and 11 for clients and suppliers,
respectively.
Consistent with expectations, we ﬁnd that large ﬁrms are more likely to threaten court
action against delinquent clients, a result consistent with the higher cost effectiveness of legal
proceedings for large transactions. The effect is large and signiﬁcant for both clients and sup-
pliers. Legal institutions are thus more important for large ﬁrms than for small ones. Direct
negotiation in delinquent payment cases seems to be the method of choice of African owners,18
perhaps reﬂecting a cultural preference for non-confrontational conﬂict resolution methods. The
length of the relationship between parties dramatically reduces the likelihood of going to court in
delinquent payment cases. The fact that the problematic client is from the same family or kin
group also reduces the likelihood of court action. These results are consistent with the idea that
valuable relationships serve to discipline contractual behavior without recourse to external
enforcement mechanisms (e.g., Ghosh and Ray (1996), Fafchamps (1998a)). The severity of the
dispute also inﬂuences the conﬂict resolution method: disputes about late delivery and non-
________________
15 Qualitatively similar results are obtained using separate logit regressions.
16 In practice, the former typically precedes the latter, but we have no data on the sequencing of actions.
17 There are only three cases of exclusive recourse (or threat of recourse) to legal institutions.
18 This effect is particularly strong in the logit regression using direct bargaining as dependent variable.12
payment are less likely to be dealt with via bargaining, and more likely to trigger threats of court
action (although the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant for suppliers). Exporting ﬁrms are shown
to be less likely to rely simply on legal institutions to resolve payment disputes. This is con-
sistent with the role that the letter of credit mechanisms plays in solving disputes.
On the supplier side, we see that dealing with monopolistic suppliers raises the probability
of doing something in response to a contractual dispute. Contrary to expectations, loyalty to sup-
pliers as measured by the percentage of purchases made from main suppliers increases the likeli-
hood of taking no action. Discussions with respondents nevertheless suggest that when parties
are extremely well acquainted with each other, minor contractual problems such as late
deliveries and quality problems are handled so easily and expeditiously that respondents do not
perceive negotiation as taking place at all. Whenever the problematic supplier is a public ﬁrm,
direct bargaining is less likely, possibly because it is unlikely to be successful: public agencies
are notorious for being unreliable suppliers so that negotiating with them for late deliveries and
poor quality is probably seen as a waste of time.
Outcome of Contractual Dispute
We conclude this section with an analysis of the outcome of contractual disputes with
clients and suppliers. Survey respondents were asked to comment on ’the most recent case’ of
non payment, etc, they had encountered. Responses are therefore subject to truncation: some of
the most recent contractual disputes have not been settled yet. We do not, however, have infor-
mation on when the dispute begun, so that we cannot correct for differences in the duration of
disputes. Two issues are therefore examined: ﬁrst, whether the contractual dispute was settled at
the time of the interview and, in this case, whether the respondent was satisﬁed with the out-
come;19 and second, whether the trade relationship continued after the dispute. Regressors are
the same as in previous regressions, except that we also control for the method of conﬂict resolu-
tion used by respondents.20 Results must be interpreted with caution because both the outcome
of the dispute and the choice of conﬂict resolution method are likely to be correlated with the
severity of the dispute, which is unobserved. For instance, respondents are unlikely to call upon
the police for help unless they feel that it is their only hope of getting satisfaction. The
coefﬁcients of conﬂict resolution methods are thus subject to omitted variable bias and should be
interpreted in that light.
With these words of warning, results are presented in Tables 12 and 13 for clients and sup-
pliers respectively. They indicate that direct bargaining is strongly associated with the settlement
of disputes and the resumption of trade. In contrast, recourse to legal institutions such lawyers,
courts, and the police result in a much higher probability that the business relationship is severed
following a payment dispute. The use of lawyers and threats of court action is also associated
with less satisfactory resolution of those disputes that are settled.
Consistent with theoretical predictions regarding the role of relationships in helping resolve
disputes, trade resumption after a payment dispute is more likely when parties know each other
well and have been trading for a long time together. Among other results of interest, we note that
African managed ﬁrms are more likely to settle payment disputes and to do so satisfactorily after
controling for ﬁrm size, age, country, and sector of activity. Combined with evidence that shared
ethnicity has a positive effect on the settlement of disputes, this can be interpreted as limited evi-
dence of a more lenient attitudes toward payment disputes and a deeper emphasis on ﬂexibility
________________
19 The small number of disputes with suppliers prevented the estimation of the satisfactory settlement regression in
the supplier case.
20 Small sample size prevented the inclusion of conﬂict resolution methods in the trade continuation regressions
for supplier disputes.13
and negotiation among African entrepreneurs.
Exporting ﬁrms are shown to be more likely to resume trade after a payment dispute than
other ﬁrms. It is not fully clear why this is the case but it is possible that exporting ﬁrms are those
that are better skilled at preserving relationships in spite of conﬂicts. Such skills would indeed be
valuable when negotiating export contracts with buyers in other countries. Finally, we note that
disputes with individual consumers are less likely to be settled, possibly because individuals are
plenty and problematic customers and suppliers are presumably more easily dispensable when
they are individuals than when they are ﬁrms. In contrast, results not shown here suggest that of
all possible disputes, those with public entities are the worst: less likely to be settled, less likely
to resume trade, and, quite understandably, less likely to leave the respondent satisﬁed. One pos-
sible explanation for these results is that trade relationships are more likely to be resumed when
respondents view the breaching party as an individual person than when they view it as an
anonymous ﬁrm or public entity. This issue deserves more research.
Conclusion
We have presented evidence that African manufacturers operate in an environment charac-
terized by contractual non-performance risk. Although more work is required to conﬁrm our
results, they are in line with the idea that most surveyed ﬁrms expect contracts to be ﬂexible. Our
ﬁndings suggest that contract non-performance is handled primarily through direct negotiation.
Only if negotiation is unsuccessful do ﬁrms turn to outsiders such as lawyers and courts and, in
certain cases, the police. When this happens, the parties are extremely unlikely to resume their
relationship. The existence of long term relationships with clients and suppliers appears to serve
as a facilitator in these disputes, raising the probability that the dispute is settled and that the out-
come is judged satisfactory. Relations based on family, friendship, or ethnicity/kinship make it
easier for ﬁrms to solve disputes but also raises the incidence of contract non-performance, the
two issues being possibly linked.
The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it demonstrates that regarding
contracts as rigid is not only inaccurate, it also fails to recognize that contractual ﬂexibility is
necessary for market exchange to take place. This ﬁnding is essential for a proper understanding
of how markets operate in practice. Second, although the data did not allow us to ascertain the
direction of causality between participation in international markets and contractual practices,
the evidence presented nevertheless suggest that the relation between the two is strong and
deserves further study. What this paper was able to show is that African manufacturers operate
in an environment where contractual disputes are frequent but are mostly dealt with through
direct negotiation. The great majority of disputes regarding late deliveries are resolved to the
satisfaction of the parties and trade is resumed thereafter. The same is true for many disputes
regarding late payment.
Taken together with evidence that entrepreneurs who are ethnic Africans seek the resolu-
tion of conﬂicts primarily through non-confrontational means, these results suggests that there
may be reasons other than rent seeking and erroneous policies for why Africa trades so little with
the rest of the world, namely that foreign ﬁrms ﬁnd it difﬁcult to deal with African ﬁrms and ﬁnd
them generally unreliable. In particular, attempts by African entrepreneurs to renegotiate
delivery and payment terms ex post -- a relatively common practice in local transactions accord-
ing to the data presented here -- are likely to be misinterpreted as opportunistic. While it would
be ill advised to overplay the idea -- other obstacles to trade remain formidable -- it nevertheless
opens the door to another way of conceiving and, hence, promoting relations between African
and foreign ﬁrms. This issue deserves further investigation.14
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Total sample Zimbabwe Zambia Kenya Ivory Coast Cameroon Burundi
Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Sector of activity:
28.1% 1169 43.5% 193 31.2% 215 25.0% 224 24.0% 179 20.2% 238 25.8% 120 textile and garment
23.8% 1169 18.7% 193 21.9% 215 25.4% 224 22.9% 179 30.7% 238 20.0% 120 metal
21.5% 1169 13.5% 193 19.1% 215 26.8% 224 26.3% 179 21.8% 238 20.8% 120 wood and furniture
26.6% 1169 24.4% 193 27.9% 215 22.8% 224 26.8% 179 27.3% 238 33.3% 120 food processing
General characteristics:
144 1123 301 189 109 213 117 222 134 179 109 200 76 120 number of employees
1977 1167 1969 192 1976 215 1975 224 1979 179 1982 237 1983 120 year of inception
60.2% 1172 74.5% 192 72.1% 215 50.9% 224 53.6% 183 62.6% 238 38.3% 120 limited liability status
28.7% 1170 24.2% 190 11.6% 216 17.0% 224 62.3% 183 32.5% 237 30.0% 120 some foreign ownership
4.7% 1185 5.4% 203 8.3% 216 2.2% 224 1.0% 179 5.3% 243 12.5% 120 some state ownership
Ethnicity of owner:
57.7% 1107 29.4% 163 59.5% 185 41.7% 223 57.0% 179 79.3% 237 81.7% 120 african origin
19.8% 1107 49.7% 163 13.0% 185 3.6% 223 33.0% 179 16.9% 237 5.8% 120 european origin
22.5% 1107 20.9% 163 27.6% 185 54.7% 223 10.1% 179 3.8% 237 12.5% 120 other originTable 2. Relationships with clients and suppliers
Total sample Zimbabwe Zambia Kenya Ivory Coast Cameroon Burundi A. With Clients:
Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Type of client:
76.4% 1131 68.2% 201 82.6% 213 77.5% 222 70.2% 191 73.0% 185 92.4% 119 sells to end-users
23.5% 1131 24.4% 201 31.5% 213 16.7% 222 16.8% 191 14.1% 185 46.2% 119 sells to public firms
9.6% 1154 9.7% 189 2.1% 214 6.7% 224 22.8% 210 9.9% 198 4.2% 119 share of exported output
Formalism:
46.0% 1131 52.2% 201 43.7% 213 45.0% 222 34.0% 191 53.0% 185 49.6% 119 written agreement
Characteristics of problematic clients:
7.7 708 6.9 92 9.6 115 6.5 107 9.5 234 5.1 113 4.1 47 length of relation (years)
41.3% 783 24.8% 149 34.8% 155 39.4% 142 58.2% 110 38.3% 149 70.5% 78 individual consumer
11.1% 783 3.4% 149 12.9% 155 11.3% 142 12.7% 110 14.8% 149 12.8% 78 public firm
11.1% 656 13.8% 109 3.7% 135 19.7% 117 7.5% 93 13.6% 132 7.1% 70 relative or kin
B. With Suppliers:
Market power:
26.9% 1144 40.1% 197 32.4% 213 17.8% 213 28.4% 204 14.7% 204 30.1% 113 one supplier monopolistic
24.2% 1136 28.9% 197 37.6% 213 15.0% 213 17.6% 199 23.5% 204 20.9% 110 one supplier public firm
27.4% 1066 16.1% 175 23.1% 213 20.7% 224 21.5% 152 46.8% 187 41.8% 115 share of imported inputs
Loyalty to supplier:
70.5% 1065 78.5% 190 64.8% 211 61.2% 214 77.9% 173 70.0% 198 76.9% 79 % inputs from one supplier
9.5 1049 14.6 191 9.5 176 9.3 202 7.9 204 7.5 188 7.0 88 length of relationship (years)
19.8% 1134 14.7% 197 15.6% 212 17.0% 212 21.1% 199 21.4% 201 37.2% 113 orders infrequent
Social network capital:
6.1% 1144 5.6% 197 4.7% 213 10.3% 213 2.9% 204 6.9% 204 6.2% 113 one supplier friend or family
11.7% 909 18.2% 121 6.6% 211 19.4% 180 4.0% 201 13.8% 196 0 one supplier same ethnicity
Credit terms:
39.2% 1144 54.8% 197 25.8% 213 43.7% 213 33.3% 204 45.1% 204 28.3% 113 receives supplier credit
21 1144 26 197 12 213 22 213 22 204 29 204 15 113 payment terms (days)
4.3% 1144 1.5% 197 0.0% 213 4.7% 213 3.9% 204 12.3% 204 2.7% 113 gives advance payment
Characteristics of problematic suppliers:
8.8% 555 8.7% 115 7.7% 117 5.0% 120 8.5% 59 9.7% 103 22.0% 41 first-time supplier
8.2 504 16.0 100 10.0 107 0.6 112 11.5 67 5.9 91 3.4 27 length of relationship (years)
13.2% 561 3.4% 117 11.1% 117 14.9% 121 32.8% 61 8.9% 101 22.7% 44 individual consumer
7.0% 561 12.0% 117 9.4% 117 8.3% 121 3.3% 61 2.0% 101 0.0% 44 public firm
Percentages refer to the proportion of responding firms in the category.  Otherwise the mean response is reported.Table 3. Contractual disputes with clients and suppliers
A. With Clients:
Total sample Zimbabwe Zambia Kenya Ivory Coast Cameroon Burundi
Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Mean N.obs. Incidence of disputes:
62.7% 1200 80.7% 202 67.8% 214 59.6% 223 42.3% 234 71.6% 208 52.9% 119 late payment
23.4 952 90.5 178 18.8 212 5.8 221 2.4 234 n.a. 3.1 107 number of cases per year
44.3% 1193 55.7% 203 39.4% 213 35.9% 223 32.9% 234 62.9% 202 40.7% 118 non-payment
2.3 985 5.6 203 1.4 212 1.3 222 1.5 234 n.a. 1.5 114 number of cases per year
Conflict resolution method (1):
78.8% 780 54.4% 147 88.5% 156 72.5% 142 85.2% 108 90.6% 149 85.9% 78 direct bargaining
7.0% 776 5.5% 146 6.4% 156 3.5% 141 9.3% 108 11.6% 147 5.1% 78 private arbitration
8.7% 766 5.5% 146 7.1% 156 4.3% 141 12.5% 104 12.8% 141 14.1% 78 police
25.2% 777 47.6% 147 17.9% 156 30.5% 141 14.8% 108 24.5% 147 3.8% 78 lawyer
25.7% 777 43.5% 147 20.5% 156 28.4% 141 17.6% 108 22.4% 147 15.4% 78 courts
Outcome of dispute (1):
49.0% 774 54.4% 147 64.3% 157 49.6% 141 44.4% 108 34.5% 145 39.5% 76 dispute settled
80.8% 375 73.1% 78 82.0% 100 88.4% 69 77.1% 48 84.0% 50 80.0% 30 satisfied with outcome (2)
43.8% 603 35.4% 144 n.a. 42.9% 140 46.2% 104 43.7% 142 58.9% 73 continue to trade
B. With Suppliers:
Incidence of disputes:
32.7% 1199 47.8% 203 26.6% 214 38.1% 223 22.2% 234 37.7% 207 19.5% 118 late delivery
5.8 1113 19.3 203 2.9 212 6.8 222 1.4 234 n.a. 0.3 113 number of cases per year
39.0% 1197 54.0% 202 48.1% 214 41.7% 223 16.7% 234 43.7% 206 28.0% 118 deficient quality
3.4 1086 7.5 193 5.4 209 4.0 219 0.4 234 n.a. 0.9 115 number of cases per year
Conflict resolution method (1)
74.3% 436 57.4% 115 76.7% 116 n.a. 81.4% 59 84.3% 102 79.5% 44 direct bargaining
4.8% 541 1.8% 113 3.4% 116 9.8% 112 8.9% 56 2.0% 101 4.7% 43 private arbitration
1.3% 547 0.0% 114 0.9% 116 2.5% 120 1.8% 57 1.0% 96 2.3% 44 police
3.8% 548 2.7% 110 4.3% 116 5.0% 121 3.4% 58 5.1% 99 0.0% 44 lawyer
3.3% 545 3.6% 110 4.3% 116 3.4% 119 0.0% 57 5.1% 99 0.0% 44 courts
Outcome of dispute (1)
70.9% 422 66.4% 107 61.2% 116 n.a. 75.4% 57 77.8% 99 86.0% 43 dispute settled
80.3% 294 76.1% 71 84.5% 71 n.a. 85.4% 41 85.3% 75 63.9% 36 satisfied with outcome (2)
80.8% 328 91.7% 109 n.a. 67.2% 119 89.8% 59 n.a. 78.0% 41 continue to trade
(1) Conditional on a dispute having occured.  (2) Conditional on the dispute being settled.
n.a.: data not available.Table 4.  Indicators of Legal Environment and the Rule of Law
Zimbabwe Zambia Kenya Ivory Coast Cameroon Burundi
5.37 4.00 3.79 3.88 2.71 n.a. Legal system enforces contracts
6.07 5.62 4.71 4.24 4.18 n.a. Legal suit against business are possible
1.89 1.97 1.78 1.91 1.71 n.a. Citizens accept legal resolution of disputes
Source: World Economic Forum (1998).  Ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
5 3 5 6 6 2.5 Law and order
4 2 4 4 4 2 Bureaucratic quality
8 8 7.5 7 7 6 Risk of expropriation
5 3 5 6 6 2.5 Government repudiation of contracts
Source: Keefer and Knack (1997).  Indices for year 1993.  A high number is good, a low number is bad.Table 5. Logit Regression on the Incidence of Contractual Problems With Clients
(Robust standard errors reported using country-level clustering)
Non-payment Late payment
z stat. Odds ratio z stat. Odds ratio Location dummies (1)
1.555 2.083 2.145 4.020 Zimbabwe
2.060 4.434 2.183 2.061 Cameroon
4.249 3.425 0.377 1.133 Ivory-Coast
0.917 1.340 -2.026 0.649 Burundi
-0.224 0.961 0.444 1.100 Zambia
0.640 1.254 0.241 1.055 Main city
1.042 1.303 0.379 1.131 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
1.650 2.175 2.811 2.889 Textile
1.361 2.227 2.413 2.611 Metal
1.453 1.847 2.445 3.281 Wood
Contractual environment:
-0.443 0.303 -0.513 0.281 Incidence of payment problems
0.043 1.038 -1.575 0.240 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
1.328 1.165 2.413 1.274 Size (2)
1.643 1.233 0.838 1.139 Age (3)
0.253 1.056 2.435 1.401 Limited liability status
0.277 1.100 -0.654 0.829 Some state ownership
-0.075 0.987 -2.545 0.764 Some foreign ownership
4.685 1.436 1.008 1.313 African owner/manager
2.333 1.583 0.944 1.290 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
1.357 1.236 0.425 1.123 Sell to individuals
0.912 1.135 2.396 1.489 Sell to public firms
-3.717 0.985 -2.690 0.986 Share of exports in sales
853 860 Number of observations
0.073 0.093 Pseudo R-squared
63% 69% Correctly classified observations
(1) Kenya is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).Table 6. Logit Regression on the Incidence of Contractual Problems With Suppliers
(Robust standard errors reported using country-level clustering)
Deficient quality Late delivery
z stat. Odds ratio z stat. Odds ratio Location dummies (1)
0.587 1.646 1.770 1.652 Zimbabwe
0.301 1.088 -1.363 0.733 Cameroon
-0.746 0.523 -0.419 0.845 Ivory-Coast
-1.729 0.288 -6.801 0.210 Burundi
2.092 1.544 -3.435 0.391 Zambia
0.183 1.045 1.132 1.393 Main city
0.391 1.101 0.601 1.189 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
-1.813 0.420 -2.538 0.493 Textile
-2.022 0.166 -1.596 0.606 Metal
-1.934 0.268 -1.768 0.493 Wood
Contractual environment:
-1.040 0.011 -0.993 0.115 Incidence of payment problems
0.088 1.118 0.419 1.449 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
8.090 1.306 5.640 1.475 Size (2)
-1.133 0.774 -1.090 0.796 Age (3)
-0.600 0.926 0.692 1.166 Limited liability status
0.507 1.512 -0.988 0.773 Some state ownership
-1.755 0.528 -0.464 0.933 Some foreign ownership
0.691 1.173 -0.472 0.819 African owner/manager
1.363 1.527 -0.674 0.875 European owner/manager
Relationship with suppliers:
0.377 1.055 0.811 1.217 One supplier monopolistic
1.928 1.366 0.290 1.096 One supplier public firm
-0.456 0.998 2.400 1.007 Share of imported inputs
-1.284 0.993 -0.673 0.997 % purchases from main supplier
0.267 1.044 -0.204 0.984 Length of relationship (4)
0.588 1.108 3.112 1.904 One supplier friend or family
-1.619 0.791 -1.246 0.708 Dummy for infrequent purchases
1.262 1.280 0.822 1.198 Receives supplier credit
2.402 2.231 0.579 1.171 Gives advance payment
710 711 Number of observations
0.084 0.141 Pseudo R-squared
64% 69% Correctly classified observations
(1) Kenya is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Log of average length of relationship with suppliers in years +1.Table 7. Selection Model of the Frequency of Payment Problems with Clients
Dependent variable is the log of the number of problems per year + 1.
Estimator is Full Information Maximum Likelihood.
Non-payment Late Payment A. Frequency equation:
z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
-0.905 -0.250 -1.116 -0.345 Zimbabwe
-0.240 -0.060 -0.011 -0.004 Ivory-Coast
-1.021 -0.154 -0.592 -0.125 Burundi
0.309 0.039 -1.319 -0.199 Main city
-0.253 -0.041 -0.579 -0.110 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
-1.565 -0.249 0.185 0.037 Textile
-2.172 -0.389 -1.243 -0.260 Metal
-1.703 -0.271 -2.251 -0.497 Wood
Contractual environment:
1.923 1.647 1.524 1.318 Incidence of payment problems
-1.190 -0.469 1.906 1.034 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
0.320 0.013 2.565 0.134 Size (2)
0.701 0.057 -0.076 -0.008 Age (3)
-0.484 -0.058 -0.477 -0.073 Limited liability status
1.988 0.437 1.366 0.431 Some state ownership
0.601 0.076 0.469 0.076 Some foreign ownership
-0.139 -0.018 0.339 0.052 African owner/manager
-0.102 -0.015 3.229 0.589 European owner/manager
3.050 1.306 1.687 1.136 Intercept
B. Selection equation:
Location dummies (1)
6.189 2.453 2.718 0.751 Zimbabwe
3.226 0.929 0.041 0.013 Ivory-Coast
-0.091 -0.016 -1.973 -0.371 Burundi
0.827 0.118 0.431 0.058 Main city
0.128 0.025 0.796 0.139 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
1.193 0.227 3.082 0.534 Textile
0.913 0.170 2.372 0.426 Metal
0.783 0.142 2.951 0.545 Wood
Contractual environment:
0.159 0.127 -0.618 -0.429 Incidence of payment problems
-0.176 -0.095 -2.056 -1.003 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
1.947 0.100 3.563 0.179 Size (2)
0.822 0.075 0.654 0.056 Age (3)
-1.014 -0.150 1.398 0.191 Limited liability status
0.334 0.097 -1.163 -0.348 Some state ownership
0.608 0.097 -1.281 -0.194 Some foreign ownership
0.838 0.126 0.927 0.132 African owner/manager
0.381 0.079 1.111 0.207 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
1.666 0.273 1.899 0.274 Sell to individual end-users
0.494 0.066 1.660 0.213 Sell to public firms
-3.926 -0.015 -2.577 -0.008 Share of exports in sales
-2.771 -1.296 -1.212 -0.654 Intercept
Selection terms:
-2.994 -0.599 -2.427 -0.548 log(rho)




634 677 Number of observations:
-677.8 -1036.5 Log-likelihood value:
(1) Kenya is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).Table 8. Selection Model of the Frequency of Problems with Suppliers
Dependent variable is the log of the number of problems per year + 1.
Estimator is Heckman 2-step; FIML did not converge.
Deficient quality Late delivery A. Frequency equation:
z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
0.444 0.158 0.704 0.214 Zimbabwe
-1.257 -0.671 -1.744 -0.809 Ivory Coast
-1.703 -0.889 -2.494 -1.021 Burundi
Sectoral dummies:
-0.572 -0.170 -0.917 -0.204 Textile
-0.526 -0.258 -1.409 -0.331 Metal
-0.008 -0.003 -0.244 -0.061 Wood
Contractual environment:
0.115 0.208 -0.398 -0.499 Incidence of payment problems
0.309 0.211 0.571 0.408 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
2.583 0.190 2.896 0.211 Size (2)
-0.328 -0.044 -0.366 -0.049 Age (3)
-0.487 -0.106 -0.504 -0.109 Limited liability status
1.170 0.499 1.285 0.545 Some state ownership
-1.994 -0.427 -2.020 -0.428 Some foreign ownership
-0.460 -0.098 -0.536 -0.112 African owner/manager
1.994 0.450 2.093 0.468 European owner/manager
1.031 1.193 2.204 1.276 Intercept
B. Selection equation:
Location dummies (1)
-0.470 -0.198 -1.622 -0.582 Ivory Coast
-0.127 -0.043 -1.366 -0.375 Burundi
Sectoral dummies:
2.527 0.617 2.123 0.457 Textile
2.566 0.905 1.166 0.246 Metal
2.228 0.631 1.397 0.294 Wood
Contractual environment:
2.438 2.935 2.550 2.172 Incidence of payment problems
4.866 2.643 3.436 2.071 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
5.142 0.324 5.032 0.318 Size (2)
-3.225 -0.425 -3.415 -0.451 Age (3)
0.852 0.145 1.265 0.220 Limited liability status
1.578 0.710 1.378 0.624 Some state ownership
0.434 0.085 0.348 0.068 Some foreign ownership
-0.010 -0.002 0.244 0.042 African owner/manager
1.147 0.257 1.622 0.360 European owner/manager
Relationship with suppliers:
1.885 0.306 1.860 0.300 One supplier monopolistic
-2.328 -0.395 -1.670 -0.275 One supplier public firm
0.234 0.001 0.081 0.000 Share of imported inputs
-0.365 -0.001 0.025 0.000 % purchases from main supplier
1.260 0.100 1.306 0.103 Length of relationship (4)
2.638 0.641 2.609 0.627 One supplier friend or family
-0.635 -0.117 -0.462 -0.085 Dummy for infrequent purchases
1.647 0.248 1.353 0.202 Receives supplier credit
0.175 0.077 -0.342 -0.148 Gives advance payment
-4.476 -3.562 -4.883 -2.577 Intercept
Selection terms:
. 0.269 . 0.374 log(rho)




503 503 Number of observations:
-549.1 -547.4 Log-likelihood value:
(1) Kenya is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Log of average length of relationship with suppliers in years +1.Table 9. Multinomial Logit Regression on the Type of Problematic Client
Client firm is the omitted category.
Government & Individual
other non-firm consumer
z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
-1.443 -1.136 -0.379 -0.220 Zimbabwe
0.161 0.146 -1.012 -0.702 Cameroon
0.575 0.622 1.458 1.163 Ivory-Coast
-0.460 -0.300 1.179 0.604 Burundi
-1.142 -0.537 -0.764 -0.281 Zambia
-0.426 -0.171 -0.878 -0.283 Main city
-0.887 -0.475 -0.039 -0.015 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
0.057 0.027 -0.044 -0.017 Textile
-1.004 -0.564 -1.086 -0.480 Metal
-0.285 -0.138 0.097 0.037 Wood
0.278 0.775 1.002 2.049 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
0.185 0.025 -3.732 -0.400 Size (2)
0.279 0.069 -0.516 -0.099 Age (3)
-1.294 -0.536 -4.276 -1.223 Limited liability status
-0.172 -0.110 0.591 0.353 Some state ownership
-0.510 -0.206 -0.614 -0.210 Some foreign ownership
0.447 0.183 1.858 0.627 African owner/manager
0.492 0.246 -0.580 -0.250 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
2.047 0.868 2.942 0.978 Sell to individual consumers
4.950 1.656 1.210 0.356 Sell to public firms
1.217 0.010 1.715 0.013 Share of exports in sales
0.085 0.027 3.257 0.794 Dispute is about non-payment (4):
-1.787 -2.211 0.303 0.289 Intercept
560 Number of observations
0.248 Pseudo R-squared
(1) Kenya is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) As opposed to late payment.Table 10. Multinomial Logit Regression on Conflict Resolution Method With Clients
Direct bargaining only is the omitted category.
Bargaining + Legal institutions
Legal institutions only (6) Doing nothing
z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
0.171 0.141 3.157 7.728 0.565 0.772 Zimbabwe
1.445 1.184 1.502 3.373 0.664 1.044 Cameroon
-0.492 -0.434 0.000 -41.051 0.000 -37.689 Ivory-Coast
-1.334 -0.881 0.000 -35.733 -1.154 -1.431 Burundi
-0.891 -0.441 -0.097 -0.103 -0.877 -0.563 Zambia
0.039 0.016 0.096 0.115 -0.275 -0.181 Main city
-0.595 -0.322 0.475 0.605 0.128 0.097 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
-0.047 -0.023 0.518 0.555 -1.198 -0.807 Textile
1.431 0.781 1.814 2.292 1.110 0.917 Metal
0.204 0.101 -1.920 -2.520 -1.647 -1.276 Wood
-0.843 -2.005 -2.742 -27.000 -1.093 -5.468 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
2.233 0.347 4.086 1.537 -0.102 -0.026 Size (2)
2.186 0.579 0.537 0.320 -0.882 -0.388 Age (3)
1.385 0.608 -0.209 -0.223 0.642 0.437 Limited liability status
1.575 1.230 0.000 -39.746 0.000 -34.985 Some state ownership
-0.797 -0.355 1.116 1.047 -1.367 -1.188 Some foreign ownership
-0.683 -0.323 -1.112 -1.166 -2.883 -2.137 African owner/manager
-0.284 -0.164 -2.146 -2.655 -1.289 -1.274 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
0.455 0.193 0.821 0.640 -0.056 -0.037 Sell to individual consumers
-0.024 -0.009 -0.382 -0.351 -1.396 -1.174 Sell to public firms
-0.898 -0.008 -1.917 -0.077 -0.538 -0.008 Share of exports in sales
Characteristics of problematic client:
1.478 0.572 1.228 0.984 2.465 1.501 Individual
-1.251 -0.626 -1.791 -2.598 -0.918 -0.682 Relative or 'tribe'
-1.953 -0.445 -1.734 -0.984 -0.400 -0.158 Length of relationship (4)
3.766 1.255 3.200 2.628 0.463 0.253 Dispute is about non-payment (5):
-2.486 -3.123 0.175 0.655 1.123 2.821 Intercept
324 Number of observations
0.2917 Pseudo R-squared
(1) Kenya is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Length of relationship = log(years of acquaintance with problematic client +1).
(5) As opposed to late payment.
(6) Recourse to one or more of the following: private arbitration; police; lawyers; courts. 
Threats of recourse to police and courts are included.Table 11. Multinomial Logit Regression on Conflict Resolution Method With Suppliers
Direct bargaining only is the omitted category.
  Some use of 
  Legal institutions (5) Doing nothing
z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
-0.356 -0.616 0.887 1.036 Zimbabwe
0.561 0.903 -0.207 -0.229 Cameroon
0.279 0.574 -0.445 -0.563 Burundi
0.667 1.175 -0.317 -0.347 Zambia
-0.390 -0.334 0.991 0.509 Main city
-0.670 -0.693 0.701 0.412 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
-0.255 -0.255 -1.747 -0.970 Textile
-0.132 -0.135 -1.220 -0.751 Metal
-0.108 -0.150 -1.949 -1.510 Wood
0.380 1.743 -0.581 -1.645 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
2.193 0.657 0.458 0.089 Size (2)
-0.509 -0.308 1.443 0.500 Age (3)
-0.470 -0.404 -1.737 -0.798 Limited liability status
-0.439 -0.574 -0.388 -0.343 Some state ownership
0.110 0.096 0.190 0.107 Some foreign ownership
0.224 0.194 0.096 0.049 African owner/manager
-1.022 -1.136 -1.042 -0.558 European owner/manager
Relationship with supplier:
0.087 0.068 -1.737 -0.770 One supplier monopolistic
-1.057 -0.838 1.557 0.628 One supplier public firm
0.284 0.003 -1.499 -0.011 Share of imported inputs
0.364 0.005 2.260 0.020 % purchases from main supplier
-0.418 -0.168 -0.942 -0.253 Length of relationship (3)
-0.095 -0.119 1.144 0.711 One supplier friend or family
0.046 0.038 -0.115 -0.061 Dummy for infrequent purchases
-0.020 -0.014 0.024 0.011 Receives supplier credit
0.674 0.747 0.093 0.092 Gives advance payment
0.258 0.172 -1.871 -0.726 Dispute about deficient quality (4):
Characteristics of problematic supplier:
1.729 3.083 0.000 -37.451 Dummy if first time supplier
0.883 0.496 -1.107 -0.316 Length of relationship (3)
2.133 2.489 1.964 1.483 Dummy if public firm
0.003 0.004 -0.355 -0.337 Dummy if individual consumer
-1.610 -5.488 -0.207 -0.416 Intercept
239 Number of observations
0.1790 Pseudo R-squared
(1) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (2) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(3) Log of average length of relationship with suppliers in years +1.
(4) As opposed to late or non delivery.
(5) Some recourse to one of the following: private arbitration; police; lawyers; courts.
Threats of recourse to police and courts are included.Table 12. Logit Regressions on Settlement of Contractual Disputes With Clients
(Robust standard errors reported using country-level clustering)
Trade relation Settlement Dispute
continues satisfactory (6) settled
z stat. Odds ratio z stat. Odds ratio z stat. Odds ratio Location dummies (1)
3.058 3.869 -1.754 0.279 1.785 1.996 Zimbabwe
1.390 2.364 -1.383 0.231 -4.649 0.211 Cameroon
-0.305 0.788 -0.065 0.938 -3.703 0.420 Ivory-Coast
1.896 2.832 -2.834 0.084 -3.081 0.478 Burundi
n.a. -0.970 0.748 2.764 1.852 Zambia
-0.195 0.926 0.564 1.901 -0.412 0.868 Main city
-1.256 0.631 -0.180 0.753 -0.897 0.736 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
0.730 1.377 -0.069 0.960 -1.914 0.451 Textile
0.970 1.278 -1.476 0.382 -8.079 0.219 Metal
0.269 1.138 -1.078 0.572 -2.283 0.391 Wood
-2.035 0.042 1.369 92.006 0.673 2.853 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
0.438 1.052 -1.534 0.687 1.502 1.241 Size (2)
-1.971 0.620 1.498 1.974 0.807 1.165 Age (3)
0.377 1.147 0.617 2.292 0.273 1.110 Limited liability status
0.716 2.176 2.758 6.573 -0.452 0.751 Some state ownership
0.794 1.579 1.307 1.628 0.195 1.046 Some foreign ownership
-1.029 0.574 2.438 4.408 2.217 2.744 African owner/manager
-2.998 0.272 -0.502 0.651 0.030 1.015 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
2.450 3.106 1.224 1.713 1.159 2.067 Sell to individual consumers
-3.256 0.437 0.118 1.110 -4.078 0.431 Sell to public firms
4.241 1.019 1.282 1.011 0.524 1.003 Share of exports in sales
Characteristics of problematic client:
0.180 1.111 -0.686 0.519 -2.298 0.450 Individual
-0.279 0.895 -0.594 0.607 2.501 2.222 Relative or 'tribe'
1.625 1.770 -1.979 0.451 0.302 1.067 Length of relationship (4)
-3.722 0.225 -3.498 0.182 -4.360 0.158 Dispute is about non-payment (5):
Conflict resolution method:
2.851 1.845 -1.605 0.432 4.642 2.501 Direct negociations
-0.197 0.835 -0.754 0.487 1.800 2.667 Private arbitration
-0.972 0.546 0.079 1.177 -1.540 0.363 Police
-5.029 0.239 -2.355 0.371 -1.248 0.668 Lawyers and courts
243 170 322 Number of observations
0.266 0.253 0.283 Pseudo R-squared
74% 84% 79% Correctly classified
(1) Kenya is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Length of relationship = log(years of acquaintance with problematic client +1).
(5) As opposed to late payment.
(6) Conditional on the dispute being settled.Table 13. Logit Regressions on Settlement of Contractual Disputes With Suppliers
(Robust standard errors reported using country-level clustering)
Trade relationship
continues Dispute settled
z stat. Odds ratio z stat. Odds ratio Location dummies (1)
-0.803 0.466 -2.472 0.126 Zimbabwe
-2.911 0.306 Cameroon
5.276 2E+04 Ivory-Coast
5.805 3E+03 0.172 1.093 Burundi
-2.253 0.239 Zambia
1.356 1.468 -1.786 0.453 Main city
1.114 1.598 -0.649 0.730 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
3.696 3.201 1.876 2.987 Textile
1.819 4.670 1.398 1.814 Metal
0.974 1.277 1.697 2.922 Wood
4.909 4E+11 3.183 62.626 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
3.633 1.116 -0.044 0.987 Size (2)
4.164 1.632 -4.451 0.544 Age (3)
0.473 1.345 -0.338 0.850 Limited liability status
-1.396 0.706 1.388 6.628 Some state ownership
-0.568 0.766 0.124 1.076 Some foreign ownership
1.471 1.816 -0.421 0.545 African owner/manager
-0.209 0.879 -0.491 0.642 European owner/manager
Relationship with suppliers:
1.946 4.133 -0.622 0.857 One supplier monopolistic
2.109 1.549 1.248 1.428 One supplier public firm
-6.319 0.996 0.721 1.004 Share of imported inputs
0.349 1.001 -0.865 0.992 % purchases from main supplier
-1.226 0.899 2.536 1.736 Length of relationship (4)
-3.347 0.289 -0.671 0.686 One supplier friend or family
-1.391 0.676 -6.837 0.299 Dummy for infrequent purchases
8.265 3.161 0.495 1.234 Receives supplier credit
-0.439 0.710 3.807 10.231 Gives advance payment
Characteristics of problematic supplier:
-0.286 0.748 -1.430 0.305 Dummy if first time supplier
-0.576 0.754 -0.010 0.997 Length of relationship (4)
-0.949 0.643 -5.151 0.229 Dummy if public firm
1.518 1.891 -0.439 0.764 Dummy if individual
-2.883 0.775 0.255 1.102 Dispute about deficient quality (5):
Conflict resolution method:
not included (6) 8.619 4.512 Direct negociations
not included (6) 0.492 1.435 Use of legal institutions
203 236 Number of observations
0.246 0.2121 Pseudo R-squared
83% 77% Correctly classified
(1) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (2) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(3) Log of average length of relationship with suppliers in years +1.
(4) Length of relationship = log(years of acquaintance with problematic client +1).
(5) As opposed to late or non delivery.
(6) These variables could not be included in the regression due to insufficient
number of observations.